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774 SECURITy-]'IRST NAT. BANK V. EARP. [19 C. (2d) 
[L. A. No. 17902. In Bank. Mar. 5, 1942.] 
SECURITY-FIRST NATIONAL BANK. OF LOS AN-
GELES (a National Banking Association), Appellant v. 
ANNA L. EARP et aI., Respondents. 
[1] Contracts-Rescission-Fraud-Misrepresentation of Instru-
ment: Reformation - Grounds - Misrepresent~tion of Instru-
ment.-A person who has been induced to enter into a con-
tract by fraudulent misrepresentations as to its contents may 
rescind or reform the contract. His negligence in failing to 
read the contract does not bar his right to relief if he was 
justified in relying upon the representations. (Civ. Code, 
§ 1689 (1).) 
[2] Fraud-Actions-Defenses-Contributory Negligence. - Con-
tributory negligence is no defense to an intentional wrong, 
such as fraud consisting of misrepresentations as to the con-
tents of an instrument. 
[3] Cancellation-Actions-,-Evidence-Su:ffi.ciency-Misrepresenta-
tion of Instrument.-In an action to foreclose a trust deed 
executed in renewal of a prior mortgage, where the defen-
dants asked that the instrument be declared void by reason of 
misrepresentation as t.o its contents, the evidence supported a 
finding that the terms of the contract were fraudulently rep-
resented to the defendants and that they were justified in 
relying upon the representation. Since they were already fam-
iliar with the terms of the old mortgage, they were justified 
in assuming that there was no necessity for reading the in-
strument that was represented to them as a renewal of that 
mortgage. 
[4] Id.-Actions-Pleading-:rraud.-In an action to foreclose a 
trust deed executed in renewal of a prior mortgage, the defen-
dants . pleaded their right to rescission sufficiently when they 
alleged a misrepresentation as to the contents of the instru-
ment and requested that the trust deed be declared void. 
[6] Id.-Conditions Precedent - Restitution - Where Party Re-
[1] See 12 Cal. Jur. 750. 
[2] See 12 Cal. Jur. 758. 
MeK. Dig. References: [1] Contracts, § 206; Reformation of 
Instruments, § 16; [2] Fraud and Deceit, § 49; [3] Cancellation 
of Instruments, § 76; [4] Cancellation of Instruments, §56; [5] 
Cancellation of Instruments, § 15. 
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ceives Nothing of Value.-The defendants in an action to fore-
close a trust deed who seck a rescission thereof by reason of 
a misrepresentation that it was a renewal of a prior mortgage 
are under no duty to mnko restitution where they received 
nothing from the plaintiff under the rescinded provision that 
they can restore. 
APPEAL from a judgment of. the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles Cuunty. Parker Wood, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action to foreclose a trust deed.. J udgrrient for plaintiff 
but refusing to declare that the deed was s~curity for one 
indebtedness, affir.med.. 
Thorpe & Bridges and. Roane Thorpe for Appellant. 
Vance Buoker and. P. N. Girard for Respondents. 
'rRAYNOR, J.-Defendants, Mr. and. Mrs.D. M. Wash-
burn, were indebted. to plaintiff, the Security First Nation::!J 
Bank of Los Angeles, in the amount of $3,000. Thu debt was 
secured by a mortgage un certain r~al property owned by ae-
fendants. In 1933 defendants, together with certain other 
persons, executed a joint and several promissory note for 
$32,750, payable to plaiutiff with interest at seven per cent. 
This noto was secured by a deed of trust on othtlr real prop-
erty. In 1939 this trust deed was for0closed and the proeeeds 
of the sale were applied to the debt, leaving an unpaid bal-
ance of $7,850.70. 
In 1935 the $3000 mortgage, outstanding for about 10 years, 
fell due. In response to a communication from plaintiff, Wash-
burn went to the bank to arrange for a renewal. According to 
Washburn's testimony he had the following conversation with 
an employee of the bank: "He wanted to know if I could make 
any payment at that time on the principal. I told him no, I 
didn't see how I could, I said, 'Couldn't you extend it, this 
mortgage for another year?' and he said, ' Well, no, I don't 
know as we· can. Some payment should be made on the prin-
cipal.' I said, 'Well, I am not able to do that right at this 
time, but I know another bank, and also a building and loan 
company, that might, that I would like to see, to see if they 
would extend or would take this property for $3000 straight 
loan, or lend $3000 straight loan on it.' And this man I was 
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talking to then said,' Well, let me see a little bit further. ' 
And he went away from this desk and away from this counter, 
and I don't know where he went, but he came back in a few 
minutes-asked me to wait a few minutes-and said that if 
I and Mrs. Washburn would come in tomorrow, that they 
would extend this mortgage for another year, which we did, 
and what I sic-ned the following day." Question: "You came 
in the next day?" Answer: "Yes. And what I si::rned the 
following day with Mrs. Washburn I assumed it wns the 
extension of the mortgage for a year, which in so many words 
I had been told it was." 
Defendants thus signed a renewal note for $3,000 at 7 % 
interest secured by what they bolieved to he the same mort-
gage extended for another year. Actually, however, the new 
encumbrance was a trust deed and contained a provision, not 
present in the previous mortgage, that it "Was g-iven to secure 
the payment of all obligations, present and future, which were 
then owing or might theroafter become owing from defen-
dants .to plaintiff. This clause, couched in legal terminology, 
was in a printed form in comparatively small print. Defen-
dants, relying upon the representation of plaintiff's employee 
that' they were signing a renewal of the old mortgage, did not 
re~d the new encumbrance and were tllerefore unaware that 
it was a trust deed containing the foregoing provisi()n. 
Defendant defaulted in the payment of the $3,000 promis-
sory nO'l~e, and plaintiff thereupon brought the present action, 
asking that the trust deed be foreclosbd and the proceeds of 
the sale' applied not only on the $3,000 obligation but also on 
the $7,850.70 still owed by defendants .to plaintiff unrl.er the 
$32,750 note. The trustee under the deed of trust and Anna 
L. Earp, to whom the Washburns had subsequently conveyed 
the property, were joined as defendants. Defendants in an-
swer alleged that plaintiff, through one of its ag-ents, induced 
them to sign the deed of trust by representing it to them as 
an extension of the mortgage, and that in reliance upon this 
representation they signed the instrument, unaware that it 
was a deed of trust or that it purported to secure any indebt-
edness other than the $3,000 loan. They therefore asked that 
the deed of trust be declared void. 
. The trial court found that defendants did not intend to 
execute a trust deed or to give the property as security for 
any indebtedness other than the $3~0001 and that they signed 
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the instrument without reading it in reliance upon the rep-
resentation of plaintiff's employee. Judgment was entered 
foreclosing the deed of trust given to secure· the $3,000 note. 
Plaintiff was awarded a personal judgment against Washburn 
for $7,850.70 with interest, but the court refused to decree 
that this indebtedness was secured by the deed of trust. Plain-
tiff has appealed on the ground that defendants' failure to 
read the instrument precludes them from setting up any mis-
representation of the contents as a defense. 
[1] It is established in California and a majority of other 
jurisdictions that a person who has been induced to enter 
into a contract by fraudulent misrepresentations as to its con-
tents may rescind or reform the contract. (Oalifornia Trust 
00. v. Oohn, 214 Cal. 619 [7 Pac. (2d) 297]; Fleury v. Ra-
macciotti, 8 Cal. (2d) 660 [67 Pac. (2d) 339]; Wenzel v. 
Schulz, 78 Cal. 221 [20 Pac. 404]; Johnson v. Sun Realty 
00., 138 Cal. App. 296 [32 Pac. (2d) 393] ; Moore v. Oopp, 
119 'Cal. 429 [51 Pac. 630]. See cases cited in 1 Page, Con-
tracts (2d.ed.) secs. 229, 230, 233; 9 Wigmore, Evidence (3d. 
ed.) sec. 2416. See Glickman v. New York Life Insurance 00., 
16 Oa1. (2d) 626 [107 Pac. (2d) 252, 131 A. L. R. 1292]; 
Seeger v. Odell, 18 Oal. (2d) 409 [115 Pac. (2d) 977]; Oal. 
Oivil Oode, sec. 1689 (1).) His negligence in failing to read 
the contract does not bar his right to relief (Oalifornia Trust 
00. v. Oohn, supra; Fleury v. Ramacciotti, supra; Wenzel v. 
Schulz, supra; Johnson v. Sun Realty 00., supra; Moore v. 
Oopp, supra. See cases cited 1 Page, Oontracts (2d~ ed.) secs. 
229, 230, 233; 9 Wigmore, Evidence (3d. ed.) sec. 2416) if 
he was justified in relying upon the representations. (See 
Seeger v. Odell, supra; Rest., Torts, §537, and cases cited 
in 12 Oal. Jur. 750 et seq.) [2] Contributory negligence 
is no defense to an intentional wrong. (See Seeger v. Odell, 
supra; Prosser, Torts, 748, 402, and cases cited in 12 CaL Jur. 
758, 759.) In the cases of Kimmell v. Skelly, 130 Cal. 555 [62 
Pac. 1067] and Gridley v. Tilson, 202 Cal. 748 [262 Pac. 322], 
relied upon by plaintiff, there were no fraudulent represen-
tations as to the contents of the contracts in question. In each 
case thedefendarit's misconception of the contract was at-
tributable solely to his' failure to read it. 
[3] In the present case there is sufficient evidence to sup-
port the finding of the trial court that the terms of the con-
tract were fraudulently represented to defendants and that 
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they were justified in relying upon the representation. Defen-
dants were not negotiating with plaintiff for the first time; 
they had in fact dealt with plaintiff for a period of ten years. 
Since they were already familiar with the terms of the old 
mortgage, they were justified in assuming that there was no 
necessity for reading the instrument that was represented to 
them as a renewal of that mortgage. 
[4, 5] In refusing to hold the trust deed as security for the 
indebtedness of $7,850.70 the trial court in effect rescinded the 
trust deed to that extent. Defendants pleaded their right to 
rescission sufficiently when they alleged the misrepresentation 
and requested that the trust deed be declared void. Since defen-
dants received nothing from plaintiff under the rescinded pro-
vision that they can restore, they are under no duty to make 
restitution. (See caS'es cited in 6 Cal. Jur. 387; 4 Cal. Jur. Ten-
year Supp. 135.) Plai1;ltiff has already received compensation 
for the extension of the indebtedness in the form of interest pay-
ments that continued until 1939, and plaintiff has a judgment 
in its favor for the unpaid principal, interest, and expenses, 
with a decree of foreclosure on the property for this amount. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Houser, 
J., and Carter, J., concurred. 
[L. A. No. 17907. In Bank. Mar. 5, 1942.] 
ROY CAMPBELL, as Trustee, etc., Respondent, v. A. OTIS 
BIRCH· et al., Appellants. 
[1] Fraud and Deceit - Actions - Evidence - Weight and Suffi.-
cbncy-Falsity.-In an action brought by a lessor and judg-
ment creditor for fraud inducing a compromise of claims on 
his judgment and for rent due and an agreement for reduc-
tion in rent, the evidence and inferences reasonably drawable 
[lJ See 24 Cal. Jur. 886; 24 Am. Jur.118. 
McK. Dig. References: [lJ Fraud and Deceit, § 82; [2] Com-
promise and Settlement, § 14; [3J Frauu. and Deceit,§40; [4] 
Appeal anJ Error, § 118; [5] Damages, § 49. 
Mar. 1942.] CAMPBELL V. BIRCH. 
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therefrom supported findings of (1) the existence of a con-
spiracy between defendants involving representations as to 
indebtedness of the lessee and as to possible foreclosure sales 
rendering him insolvent unless the plaintiff modified his claims, 
(2) the falsity of the representations, (3) the purpose. 
of inducing plaintiff to act upon the representations, and ( 4) 
his reliance thereon in executing t1.e compromise and modifi-
cation agreements, and this, although there was no evidence 
that one defendant made any representation, and no direct 
evidence that she knew what the other was doing. 
[2a, 2b] Compromise andSettlement-A\.,tions'-Damages_Mea_ 
sure.-Where a lessor is by fraud induced to compromise his 
claims for rent part of which was reduced to jUdgment and the 
balance admittedly due, the lessor electing to stand on the 
contract and sue for dal:J.ages is not required to prove, and 
the court is not required to find, that the claims· relinquished 
were in fact collectible. Where· the claim forming the basis 
of a compromise is fixed and certain, and where the plaintiff 
under any theory is entitled to keep the amount paid, the 
measure of damages, s" far as general damages are con-
cerned, is prima facie the difference between the amount paid 
on the compromise and the fixed and certain claim. 
[3] Fraud - Actions - Election of Remedies.-Where an advan-
tageous contract is secured by fraud, the injured party may 
elect to affirm the contract and sue. for the fraud. 
[4] Appeal- Presenting and Reserving Objections _ Presenting 
N"1w Defenses.-In an action for damages for fraud inducing 
a compromise, a claim by the defendants that the court should 
have considered a guaranty of rent as reduced by agreement 
and the value of a canceled option to purchase may not be 
urged for the first time on appeal. 
[5] Damages-Attorneys' Fees-Litigation Arising out i)f Lease.-
Attorneys' fees are properly allowed in an action for fraud 
predicated upon false statements of a lesseE' which induced the 
lessor to compromise his claims, where the claims forming the 
basis of th{· jl:dgment arp for the difference b~tween the re-
duced rentals and the amount called for in the' lease, and also 
for tho difference due under the lease and the amount of 
the compromise, and where the lease 1 :ovirled for payment by 
the lessee of all reasonable costs and attorneys' fees in litiga-
tion "arising out of or in connection with this lease or the 
construction or enforcement thereof." 
[3] See 12 Cal. Jur. 781; 24 Am. Jur. 8 •. 
